



















The Unripe Fruits of Rapprochement: 
Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Helsinki Era 
By Ioannis N. Grigoriadis 
Bilkent University 
Introduction-The Helsinki Milestone 
3 April 2006 was not an ordinary day in the history of the National Bank of Greece 
(NBG). Greece’s biggest and oldest bank announced the acquisition of Turkey’s 
eighth largest bank, Finansbank. This was by far the biggest foreign investment ever 
realized by a Greek company. It was also the biggest foreign direct investment deal 
for that year in Turkey. Nonetheless, not everyone was happy on either coast of the 
Aegean. On the Turkish side, many opinion makers were weary about the prospects of 
foreign –let alone Greek– domination in the country’s financial sector. Greek 
columnists, in contrast, raised concerns about the enormous risk that investing billions 
of Euros in a country as volatile and as inimical to Greece as Turkey entailed. What 
made this previously unthinkable deal possible –and ultimately successful– was what 
had transpired in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999.  
The December 1999 decision of the European Council in Helsinki is normally 
considered to be the milestone of a new era in Greek-Turkish relations. Yet it did not 
come out of the blue. A slow change in bilateral relations could be observed since the 
mid 1990s, despite adversities and setbacks. The first signals of a new approach 
became evident in 1994. Yannos Kranidiotis, who served as Deputy and Alternate 
Foreign Minister, became a key figure, who succeeded in changing the agenda of 
Greek-Turkish relations. In March 1995, Greece lifted its veto against the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union and the disbursement of the Fourth Additional Protocol funds under 
the condition that accession negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union 
would begin within six months after the end of the EU Intergovernmental Conference 
–that is within 1998. The customs union between Turkey and the European Union 
came into force on 1 January 1996. The decision of the Greek government to lift its 
veto marked a first shift as regards Greek views of EU-Turkey relations. Nonetheless, 
in the views of most experts and the public opinion, it was still seen as a sacrifice in 
order to promote a major national goal, namely promote Cyprus’ EU membership 
perspective. Relations remained frosty and in fact deteriorated when the Turkish 
National Assembly issued a declaration that an extension of Greek territorial waters in 
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the Aegean to twelve miles would be a casus belli for Turkey. The succession of 
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou by the moderate Konstantinos Simitis coincided 
with the Imia/Kardak crisis which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of armed 
conflict over the sovereignty of an islet in the Aegean.1 Greece’s development of a 
“joint defense doctrine” with Cyprus and its support for Cyprus’ decision to install a 
unit of S-300 anti-aircraft ballistic missiles in 1998 only made relations worse. An all-
time low was reached in February. It was then revealed that Abdullah Öcalan, the 
leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Turkey’s most wanted person had 
found refuge in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi before being captured by Turkish 
security forces. 
The Öcalan crisis proved an opportunity for the Simitis administration to 
reorient its foreign policy towards Turkey and take a more moderate stance. 
Accepting to host the controversial S-300 missiles in Crete instead of Cyprus was a 
first signal of this change. Appointing George Papandreou –a known moderate– to the 
Foreign Minister office in the aftermath of the Öcalan crisis would lead to a set of 
developments which would catalyze Greek-Turkish relations. Interestingly the Greek 
academic community remained aloof from this shift which remained limited to the 
political elite.2 Shortly after the Öcalan affair, Foreign Ministers George Papandreou 
and Ismail Cem started taking careful steps towards the normalization of Greek-
Turkish relations. A first opportunity for dialogue emerged with the outbreak of the 
Kosovo war, a major regional crisis involving both countries.3 In May 1999 
Papandreou and Cem launched a dialogue initiative. Avoiding the “explosive” high-
politics disputes, both ministers prioritized collaborating in low-profile bilateral 
issues, such as trade, tourism and environment. This timid détente attempt was 
unexpectedly facilitated by two earthquake disasters which hit Turkey and Greece in 
August and September 1999, respectively. The two earthquakes, which took place 
within a few weeks, allowed for a stunning wave of mutual sympathy and 
                                                 
1 For more details on the state of Greek-Turkish relations of that era and the role of the Imia/Kardak crisis, see 
Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", Mediterranean 
Politics 2, no. 3 (1997). 
2 Panayotis Tsakonas, "Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy", Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies 5, no. 3 (2005): 431-34. 
3 Alexis Heraclides, "Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation", The Review of 
International Affairs 1, no. 3 (2002): 21-22. 
 3 
compassion. While there was no causal relationship between the post-earthquake 
sentiment and the rapprochement process, it clearly showed that the two peoples were 
more willing to accept a breakthrough in bilateral relations than previously thought.4 
It also meant that a change of Greek policy on EU-Turkey relations would not meet 
the feared vehement objection of media and public opinion. 5 
The December 1999 Helsinki European Council summit set a milestone for 
that change. On the one hand, Greece agreed to the Council decision naming Turkey 
an EU candidate. On the other hand, conditions were set regarding Greek-Turkish 
relations and the Cyprus question. Before the advent of EU accession negotiations, 
Turkey was expected to resolve its bilateral disputes with Greece –or alternatively, 
agree to refer them to the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, it was declared 
that the settlement of the Cyprus question –while desirable- did not constitute a 
precondition for Cyprus’ EU membership. In effect, Greece was attempting to move 
the Cyprus issue and its bilateral disputes with Turkey to the European level, hoping 
that this would catalyze their resolution.6 
The Helsinki decision hence attempted to consolidate a détente and navigate a 
reconciliation process through fostering the resolution of the two disputes that 
shadowed bilateral relations for decades, the Cyprus and the Aegean questions. Both 
countries had declared their commitment to a rapprochement process which aimed to 
reframe bilateral relations, open new avenues of cooperation and contribute to 
innovative thinking and compromise solutions for the long-standing bilateral disputes. 
This was by no means an easy process, yet it was possible to discern a paradigmatic 
shift at the elite level in both countries from a zero-sum-game and relative-gains-
driven approach of bilateral relations to a positive-sum-game and absolute-gains-
driven approach. Both sides came to the conclusion that they would be better off if 
                                                 
4 Ahmet O. Evin, "Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An Assessment of the Post-Earthquake 
Rapprochement", Turkish Studies 5, no. 1 (2004): 8. 
5 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Greek and Greek Cypriot Views of Turkey's Accession to the European Union: 
On the Endurance of a Spectacular Paradigmatic Shift" in Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Yannis A. 
Stivachtis, eds., Turkey and the European Union: Dilemmas, Constraints and Opportunities (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2008a), 155. 
6 On the EU role in Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, see Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, 
"Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?", Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 1 (2008): 
135-40. 
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their neighbor flourished and not if it got embroiled into a financial or political crisis. 
Greece began viewing Turkey not just as a military threat but also as a potential 
economic partner of paramount importance. Turkey started seeing Greece not as the 
biggest stumbling block to the country’s EU membership ambitions but as a reliable 
supporter with a sincere interest in the successful completion of Turkey’s EU 
accession process. This strategic shift on the Greek side had as prerequisite Greece’s 
emancipation from an “underdog culture”7 which dominated its foreign policy, its 
own socialization to European norms and effective Europeanization. Under these 
conditions, 
a “socialized” and “Europeanized” Greek foreign policy should now 
embark upon the more ambitious project to “socialize” – by using 
the vehicle of the EU and its weight in the international arena – the 
state, which remained Greece’s main security concern and the 
driving force behind most of its security and foreign policy 
initiatives.8 
Twelve years after the Helsinki milestone and the launch of the rapprochement 
process, the picture remains mixed. On the one hand, major improvements have been 
noted in the field of economy, energy and minority rights. On the other hand, the 
process failed to remove the two biggest obstacles to the normalisation of relations, 
the Cyprus and the Aegean issues. 
  
                                                 
7 On the Greek “underdog culture,” see Nikiforos Diamandouros, Cultural Dualism and Political 
Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece [Working Paper 1994/50] (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de 
Estudios e Investigaciones, 1994), 33-35. 
8 Panayotis Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece's 
Socialization Strategy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 87-88. 
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The Helsinki Dividend 
a. Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
Early attempts to introduce confidence-building measures (CBMs) dated back to 1988 
and Foreign Ministers Papoulias and Yılmaz but were allowed to fall into lapse. A 
second attempt was made at the NATO level in 1997 with meager results. These 
CBMs dealt with military issues and aimed to prevent a “hot incident” in the Aegean. 
Following the Helsinki decision, however, a comprehensive set of CBMs was 
introduced for the first time. The first set of measures was named “tension reduction 
measures” and aimed to improve transparency between the two governments and 
military leaderships. The second set of measures was “environmental” and focused on 
low-level cooperation in order to prevent the pollution of the river Evros (Meriç) 
which forms the largest part of the two countries’ land border. While the scope of 
cooperation was rather limited, these CBMs were of paramount significance. They 
contributed to the establishment of a tacit security regime between Greece and Turkey 
and undermined the dominant zero-sum-game mentality in bilateral relations. 
Bringing both the government and the military leaderships closer also meant that the 
chances of armed conflict became considerably reduced.9 
b. Economic Relations 
While no breakthrough was achieved with regard to the Aegean and Cyprus issues, 
the détente bore undeniable fruit at the economic level.10 While in 1993 bilateral trade 
volume was $223 million, this figure became $1.014 billion in 2002, $1.250 billion in 
2003, $1.547 billion in 2004, $1.666 billion in 2005 and $2.174 billion in 2006. 
During a meeting of the Greek-Turkish Business Forum in January 2008 Prime 
Ministers Karamanlis and Erdoğan announced that the bilateral trade volume nearly 
reached $3.000 billion in 2007. This represented about $ 1.000 billion of Greek 
exports towards Turkey and $2.000 billion of Turkish exports towards Greece. While 
bilateral trade reached a peak of $3.58 billion in 2008, the global economic crisis 
exacted a heavy toll. In 2009 it fell to $2.76 billion and reached $2.997 billion in 
2010, according to Turkish statistical authorities. Foreign direct investment (FDI), on 
the other hand, moved towards the opposite direction. Alongside the acquisition of 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pp. 115-17. 
10 Constantine A. Papadopoulos, Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or 
Hostage to Politics [Occasional Paper] (Oxford: SEESOX, 2008). 
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Finansbank by NBG, hundreds of Greek companies invested in Turkey in a wide 
array of economic sectors. About $6.6 billion of Greek FDI has flown into the Turkish 
economy. The bulk of this amount, about $5.800 billion, has been invested in 
Turkey’s financial sector.  Greece’s service-oriented economy, boosted by the 
country’s entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), particularly in the 
financial sector, has facilitated Greek FDI in Southeastern Europe at large, and now in 
Turkey as well. Altogether, 44 Greek enterprises had invested in Turkey in 2002, a 
figure that rose to 80 in 2005, 130 in September 2006 and 450 in 2011. Less interest 
was manifested on the Turkish side. In 2006, about 10 Turkish enterprises had 
invested in Greece, mainly in a small scale in the retail sector (food, clothing etc). In 
2011 only $0.23 billion of Turkish FDI was invested in Greece. 
Compensating, however, for modest FDI in Greece from Turkish companies, 
Turkish exports have enjoyed a notably consistent surplus in value ranging from 30 to 
40 percent over Greek exports during the 2000s.  There are structural reasons for 
Turkey exporting more to Greece, as the contribution of manufacturing to GDP is 
significantly higher in the former and Turkey’s GDP is larger than Greece’s. 
Generally speaking, Greek exports are composed of commodities with a low value 
added component.  By contrast, Turkish exports are more diversified manufactured 
goods with a higher value added component. It is hard to overstate the significance of 
this trend for bilateral relations. At the economic level, it created lucrative business 
opportunities, as business elites on both sides realised what decades of bilateral 
diplomatic confrontation had occluded.11 Greek and Turkish economies were 
complementary in many sectors, and there existed an enormous potential for further 
lucrative economic cooperation.  
c. Energy relations 
The construction of a pipeline connecting the Greek and Turkish national gas grid 
opened new prospects for cooperation in the field of energy which could have 
implications on the European level.12 The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) 
                                                 
11 Dimitris Tsarouhas, "The Political Economy of Greek-Turkish Relations", Journal of Southeast 
European & Black Sea Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 40. 
12 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Natural Gas Corridors in Southeastern Europe and European Energy Security 
[ELIAMEP Thesis No. 2] (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), 
2008b). 
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was the first pipeline project to highlight increased interest in Southeastern Europe as 
a transport hub of non-Russian natural gas. A joint venture of the Greek natural gas 
company DEPA, the Turkish BOTAŞ and the Italian Edison, ITGI consisted of two 
phases. In the first, a 285 km-long pipeline would be built between Komotini and 
Karacabey, 200 km on Turkish and 85 km on Greek territory and connect the natural 
gas grids. In the second phase, the construction of an undersea pipeline between 
Stavrolimenas and Otranto would connect the networks of Greece and Italy. The 
pipeline capacity was planned to begin with 0.75 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2007 
and reach 12 bcm by 2012. In 2008, 0.443 bcm were exported to Greece, 0.721 bcm 
in 2009 and 0.66 bcm in 2010. Up to 3 bcm would be directed towards the Greek 
energy market, while the remaining volume would reach the Italian natural gas 
network. The possible extension of the ITGI from Greece towards the Western 
Balkans was also discussed. The construction of the Greek-Turkish leg of the pipeline 
began in summer 2005, and the first gas flowed in November 2007. In June 2008, 
DEPA and Edison announced their joint venture IGI Poseidon SA, whose task was the 
construction of the Greek-Italian undersea leg of the pipeline. The construction of the 
212 km-long pipeline was expected to cost approximately 500 million Euros, with its 
completion scheduled in 2015. Through the construction of the Greek-Turkish leg of 
the ITGI pipeline Greece gained access for the first time to natural gas originating 
from the Caspian basin. This project was of paramount importance for European 
energy security, since it transported non-Russian –initially Azerbaijani– natural gas to 
the European market. European concerns arising from EU dependence on the import 
of Russian natural gas have led to the search for alternative energy supply routes. This 
was a clear example of the new positive sum game mentality. The two countries 
would no more seek to collect relative gains or capitalise on their strategic position 
against each other.13 On the contrary, they would join efforts to boost their strategic 
weight and contribute to European energy security. 
d. Minority Issues 
                                                 
13 Earlier Greek and Turkish attempts to construct competing oil pipelines bypassing the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles are indicative of the previous mindset. 
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Minorities in Greece and Turkey have often been subjected to negative reciprocity 
and treated as hostage to bilateral relations.14 Often becoming victims of retaliatory 
measures, minorities faced negative reciprocity which meant that respect for their 
rights was conditional upon full respect for the same rights on the other side of the 
border. This very often led to extremely unfair situations which attracted the attention 
of international courts. In Western Thrace, Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code 
was used for decades to strip minority members of their Greek citizenship. While 
minority rights improved significantly in the 1990s and Article 19 was abolished, 
several thorns remained. The recognition of the right of individual self-determination 
remained a desideratum. Associations which used the term “Turkish” in their titles 
were banned by Greek courts, as they were considered a “threat against public order.” 
Several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) recognised the 
right of individual self-identification and found Greece guilty for violating the 
European Convention of Human Rights when banning associations for the inclusion 
of the term “Turkish” in their names.15 Yet this failed to have a clear impact on the 
jurisprudence of Greek courts. Moreover, a dispute emerged regarding the election of 
the religious leadership of the Western Thrace minority. While the Greek government 
insisted that the muftis would be appointed by the state, local minority leaders 
claimed the right to freely elect their religious leaders. The existence of a state-
appointed official and a popular elected mufti became a constant source of tension 
between state authorities and the minority. While avoiding taking a clear position on 
the key question, the ECHR stated in its decision that by punishing the elected mufti 
for performing his religious functions Greece violated Article 9 of the Convention 
which protects freedom of religion.16 
                                                 
14 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Europe Overshadowed: Reciprocity as a Race to the Bottom in Religious 
Freedom" in Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Kerem Oktem, eds., Under the Long Shadows 
of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post-Nationalism (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 169-70. 
15 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et al. vs. Greece [No. 26698/05] 
(Strasbourg, 2008).. 
16 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Şerif vs. Greece [No. 38178/97] (Strasbourg: Second 
Section, 2000). 
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Meanwhile, Turkey’s Greek minority fell victim to the vicissitudes of Greek-
Turkish relations and reached the limits of demographic extinction.17 A series of 
discriminatory measures, like the 1943 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi), the 6-7 
September 1955 pogrom against Istanbul Greeks, the 1964 expulsion of Istanbul 
Greeks who held Greek citizenship, confiscation of private and foundation immovable 
property all led the bulk of the Greek minority to emigration. From 125,000 it fell 
below 5,000 by the late 1990s. Even worse was the toll in the two Aegean islands of 
Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos), whose Greek population fell to a couple 
of hundreds.18  
Moreover, discriminatory measures affected minority institutions. The 
Ecumenical Patriarchate was severely hit. Its ecumenical character was refused by the 
Turkish state which argued that it was solely a religious institution catering for the 
religious needs of Turkey’s Greek minority. In one of the most publicised cases, the 
religious seminary which operated in the island of Heybeliada (Halki) since 1841 was 
closed in 1971 and remained as such since then. Turkish courts even denied a legal 
personality to the Patriarchate and minority pious foundations. This meant that their 
immovable property was subject to confiscation by the state. Over the years 
foundations were shut by court decisions and their immovable assets were 
confiscated. The right of the surviving foundations to obtain and own property was 
also challenged, and this led to additional confiscations. Following years of hesitation, 
Greek minority foundations appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). In a path-breaking case, the ECHR declared that Turkey clearly violated the 
Convention by confiscating minority foundation property.19  
Turkish authorities started to implement court decisions, and in August 2011, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan promised the return of a significant part of the minority 
foundation property. An administrative decree was issued shortly thereafter, which 
gave the right to minority foundations to apply for restitution to their state-confiscated 
property. This was welcomed by Greek minority representatives although it was far 
                                                 
17 On this, see Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-
1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).. 
18 For more on this, see Alexis Alexandris, "Imbros and Tenedos: A Study of Turkish Attitudes toward 
Two Ethnic Greek Island Communities since 1923", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 7, no. 1 (1980).. 
19 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi vs. Turkey [No. 34478/97] 
(Strasbourg: Former Second Section, 2007). 
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from complete restitution of the Greek minority to its property rights. Following 
decades of discrimination, minority Greeks thought that the AKP administration could 
deliver solution to some of their problems. Supporting Turkey’s democratisation and 
Europeanization process was also essential. The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, 
despite widespread suspicion by Turkish nationalists, has been one of the most 
consistent and ardent supporters of Turkey’s EU membership vocation, arguing that 
this is the best guarantee for religious freedom and the survival of the decimated 
Greek minority. 
  
The Missed Opportunity of 2004 
The Cyprus Question 
Following the Helsinki decision and while Turkey’s EU reform process was 
proceeding, significant progress was achieved in both the Cyprus and Aegean 
disputes. The UN-mediated Cyprus negotiation process led to a comprehensive 
resolution plan submitted by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in November 
2002. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council approved the 
membership of the Republic of Cyprus, which had declared its support for the Plan 
and postponed a decision on the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations until 
December 2004. Following consecutive amendments, the Annan Plan was submitted 
to a referendum on both sides of the island on 24 April 2004. While former Cypriot 
President Glafkos Klerides, who had achieved Cyprus membership of the European 
Union, had been a strong supporter of a compromise solution, the newly elected 
President Tassos Papadopoulos in a dramatic shift advised the people to reject the 
plan. His advice was followed. While 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots accepted the 
Plan, also supported by Turkey, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan. As a 
result, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 without a 
resolution of the Cyprus question. In December 2004, the Brussels European Council 
set 3 October 2005 to be the start date of Turkey’s accession negotiations. 
Nonetheless, the Cyprus issue remained an obstacle to the smooth progress of 
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and continued to poison bilateral Greek-Turkish 
relations. The launch of accession negotiations became possible only after a 
diplomatic marathon. Turkey’s refusal to sign the Additional Protocol expanding its 
customs union to the new EU member states, which could, according to one 
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interpretation, implicitly amount to the de facto recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus, led to Cypriot vetoes on several negotiation chapters. 
The failure to reach an agreement on the Cyprus issue in 2004 also had a 
deleterious effect on Greek-Turkish relations. While the Cyprus question is not a 
bilateral but an international issue, it undeniably has a bearing upon bilateral relations. 
The rise of the Cyprus question in 1955 has had a catastrophic spillover effect to 
bilateral disputes. Minority questions and the Aegean dispute arose or took bigger 
proportions in the context of yet another episode of the Cyprus conflict. Following the 
rejection of the Annan plan in the 2004 referenda, the prospects for a resolution 
became dimmer as the President of the Republic of Cyprus Tassos Papadopoulos took 
a more intransigent stance. Meanwhile, hopes for swift progress in Turkey’s EU 
accession negotiations were fast fading, and this removed a crucial incentive for 
Turkey’s to remain interested in a solution. The surprise election of Demetris 
Christofias to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008 was hoped 
to bring a new impetus to the negotiation process, yet soon thereafter in April 2008 
the moderate Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat lost its seat to the hardliner 
Derviş Eroğlu.20 UN-assisted, bi-communal negotiations failed to produce a 
breakthrough, and there was wide speculation about the need for a stronger 
engagement of the international community in the conflict resolution process. The 
climate deteriorated in July 2011 when Prime Minister Erdoğan during his visit to the 
northern part of Cyprus on the anniversary of the 1974 Turkish invasion stated that 
“there is no such thing as the Republic of Cyprus”and precluded the return of 
Morphou (Güzelyurt) and Varosha (Maraş) in case of a solution. Both towns would be 
turned over to Greek Cypriots according to the provisions of the 2004 Annan Plan. A 
bicommunal summit meeting with the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon failed in November 2011 in Long Island, New York failed to produce any 
tangible results. 
 
The Aegean Dispute 
Having their roots in the 1970s, the disputes between Greece and Turkey over the 
delineation of their maritime borders have become a source of perennial conflict. The 
                                                 
20 International Crisis Group (ICG), Cyprus: Six Steps toward a Settlement [Europe Briefing No. 61] 
(Brussels, 2011), 3-4. 
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width of territorial waters, airspace, the delineation of continental shelf, jurisdiction 
over the Flight Information Region (FIR) and the demilitarisation of Eastern Aegean 
islands have comprised the main body of disputes.21 The 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea added a new dimension to the dispute, as it gave 
littoral states the right to extend their territorial waters up to twelve miles. While 
Turkey refused to sign the Convention, declaring itself as a “persistent objector,” the 
Convention entered into force in November 1994. The declaration of the Andreas 
Papandreou government that it would exercise the right of extending its territorial 
waters to twelve miles led to a fierce Turkish reaction. In June 1995 the Turkish 
parliament adopted a resolution which declared Greece’s extension of territorial 
waters to twelve miles to be a “casus belli.” In January 1996, the Aegean dispute took 
new dimensions when Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war over the 
sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islets. Thereafter Turkey challenged the sovereignty 
of Greece over hundreds of islands, islets and rocks throughout the Aegean Sea and 
the Mediterranean, thus dramatically expanding the scope of the conflict. Moreover, 
disputes over airspace and the FIR led to almost daily dogfights between Greek and 
Turkish military aircraft. These became a constant financial haemorrhage, led to 
occasional accidents claiming pilot lives and raised the risk of a “hot incident.” These 
contributed to a steady flow of negative news which consolidated the view that 
improvements in Greek-Turkish relations were cosmetic at best and a resolution of the 
conflict was in fact impossible. 
Against this rather negative backdrop, the Helsinki spirit did make some 
difference. Moreover, regular meetings of diplomatic delegations from the two 
countries were launched with the aim to negotiate the pending disputes. This was in 
line with the Helsinki decision which stated that both countries would have to bring 
their disputes in front of the Court by the end of 2004, if bilateral negotiations failed 
by then. While the content of negotiations was never publicized, it was thought that a 
package compromise solution over the whole range of the Aegean dispute, including 
the width of territorial waters, and the delineation of continental shelf, was intensively 
discussed, with the aim to refer any pending issues to the International Court of 
Justice. The process reached a peak in 2004, when the Helsinki decision deadline 
                                                 
21 For a wholesome account, see Alexis Heraclides, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined 
Enemies (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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about the bilateral resolution of the dispute expired. Nevertheless, the advent of the 
Karamanlis administration resulted in a new approach to the Helsinki process.  
While it did not undo the rapprochement process, the Karamanlis government 
did not take the conflict resolution process to its logical consequences, namely that the 
peaceful judicial resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean would probably 
entail a compromise which would not be identical with the official Greek position.22 
Unwilling to take the rise of a judicial verdict which would displease Greek public 
opinion and despite the longstanding Greek official position, the Karamanlis 
administration opted not to impose the referral of the Aegean dispute to the 
International Court of Justice in December 2004, when the start of Turkey’s EU 
accession negotiations was decided. In line with the policy of the Papadopoulos 
administration in Cyprus, the Greek government opted for postponing the resolution 
of the bilateral disputes through a compromise, hoping that as EU-Turkey accession 
negotiations were moving forward, Greece and Cyprus’s bargaining position would be 
substantially improved. Following 2004, economic relations continued to flourish, and 
cooperation expanded into hitherto unexplored fields. Fifty-two negotiation rounds 
took place until June 2011. Nonetheless, the amenable political conditions existing in 
2004 on all sides to promote a resolution of the Aegean dispute have not emerged 
since then. EU-Turkey accession negotiations have faced stiff obstacles due to a 
variety of reasons attributed to both sides. In 2009 Greece was immersed into the 
biggest economic and political crisis in decades. Turkey, buoyed by its economic 
success, has embarked on a new, ambitious foreign policy. Aiming to consolidate its 
new role as a major regional and emerging global power, it has appeared less 
interested in its EU membership or in a comprehensive settlement of the bilateral 
disputes with Greece, in particular since a compromise solution would displease its 




The establishment of a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) between 
Greece and Turkey in April 2010 appeared to pave the way for a breakthrough in 
bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the outbreak of the global financial crisis or “great 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 154-57. 
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recession” in 2008 had ushered in developments which reconfigured international 
politics and redefined the position of states in the international arena. Greece and 
Turkey were substantially affected, albeit in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
Greece’s long-concealed economic, social and political problems came to the fore at 
once, and the country entered a multifaceted economic, political and social crisis of 
historic proportions. On the other hand, Turkey appeared to be better prepared than 
most developed economies to navigate through the turbulent waters of the global 
crisis. Turkish GDP grew at rates comparable to these of China, and this lent to the 
Turkish government a rising sense of self-confidence and gave way to a new strategic 
vision. Turkey would no more aspire to be an active member the Western security 
community, but would aim to become a transregional and global power, a “central 
power” in the expression of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. In addition, Turkey’s 
declared ambitions about a new, “zero-problems with neighbours’ policy” seemed to 
put Greek-Turkish disputes and the Cyprus question on a new footing.  
These parallel but antithetical developments inevitably bore their imprint on 
bilateral relations. Due to the Greek recession, bilateral trade fell, Turkish enterprises 
withdrew from or postponed their Greek investments. Some Greek investors in 
Turkey declared their intention to liquidate their investments in search for cash, while 
even NBG was seeking to sell 20 percent of Finansbank. As the Greek government 
was focused on the economic emergency, Greece’s international relations attracted 
relatively little attention. Moreover, the enormous political cost of the economic 
austerity program made it highly unlikely that the Greek government would undertake 
any costly political decision in the direction of putting forward a resolution of the 
bilateral disputes, fearing that this could be perceived as a surrender of Greek national 
rights under the worst possible circumstances. The argument that the Greek-Turkish 
conflict was one of the reasons that led Greece to financial distress due to the defence 
expenses that it necessitated did not appeal to wide swaths of public opinion.  
 
Cyprus- The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Controversy 
While little changed in the UN-facilitated bi-communal negotiations in Cyprus, 
tension rose following oil and gas exploration offshore the southeastern coast of the 
island. Growing indications that significant oil and natural gas reserves may be 
located under the seabed of the eastern Mediterranean Sea led the Republic of Cyprus 
to the decision to declare its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the island. 
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While this could have been a foolhardy move in the past, deteriorating relations 
between Israel and Turkey had opened a window of opportunity. A series of bilateral 
agreements with Lebanon, Israel and Egypt paved the way for the launch of 
exploratory drillings in the sea between Cyprus and Israel. This irritated Turkey which 
argued that Cyprus did not have the right to explore off-shore oil and gas without 
consulting with the Turkish Cypriots. Interestingly Turkey based its argument on the 
1959-1960 Treaties of Zurich and London which established the Republic of Cyprus, 
while it has otherwise refused to recognise as an independent state since 1963 and has 
recognized the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” since 1983. The crisis 
had the potential of reigniting the Greek-Turkish maritime border disputes and even 
expand them from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Political pressure 
mounted on the Greek government to declare its own Exclusive Economic Zone in the 
Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a move could be considered as 
undermining the basis of bilateral negotiations on the continental shelf and raise the 
question of delineating the maritime borders of Megisti (Kastellorizo), the 
easternmost Greek island located between Rhodes and Cyprus. 
 
Conclusions 
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems with neighbours’ policy” was aimed to 
relieve Turkey of its bilateral disputes in order to advance it to a leading position in 
global politics. While at first it was argued that resolving bilateral problems with 
neighbours was a prerequisite for Turkey to play its global role, it soon appeared, 
however, that Turkey lacked the diplomatic capacity to further all these objectives 
simultaneously. Turkey’s regional and global ambitions meant, in the end, that the 
resolution of bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes and the Cyprus problem would not be 
high on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. This was valid in particular since the 
prospect of Turkey’s full EU membership appeared to be rather dim in the end of 
2011. 
There is still strong debate on both sides of the Aegean whether the 
fundamentals of the countries’ political relationship have improved, subsequent to the 
1999 Helsinki milestone and the initiation of Turkey’s EU accession process.23  What 
                                                 
23 Papadopoulos, Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics, 
34-37. 
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no one could gainsay, however, is the impetus that this process has given to their 
growing economic interdependence. In retrospect, the lifting of the Greek veto against 
Turkey’s EU accession process catalysed the economic interaction of the two 
countries. Whereas Greek-Turkish relations had faced détente periods in the past, the 
present one has been a qualitatively different phase. While bilateral Greek-Turkish 
relations have significantly improved despite high-politics disputes, there are certain 
limits set by the lack of a solution in Cyprus and the Aegean. It would be impossible 
to discuss a reconsideration of Greece’s security doctrine and a substantial decrease of 
defence expenditures without a resolution of the Cyprus question. It is also hard to 
promote the concepts of cooperation through the European integration, if these fail 
utterly on the island of Cyprus to unite Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Functional 
cooperation may have delivered great dividends over the last twelve years, yet its 
potential to transform Greek-Turkish relations is not unlimited. While a reversal to the 
old animosity may look unlikely, a breakthrough is also hard to imagine without 
strong leadership. External conditions such as Europeanization process and domestic 
political and social stability can greatly help in that direction. The fruits of 
rapprochement can, however, only ripen through visionary leadership. To win a 
common future within the European family, Greeks, Turks and Cypriots need to be 
led by inspired leadership to compromise- and rule-of-law-based solutions geared 
towards a common future within the European family.  
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